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Grounding Emotion in Situated Conceptualization | Concept | Self-Improvement

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Semántica cognitiva
  Neuropsychologia 49 (2011) 1105–1127 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Neuropsychologia  journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/neuropsychologia Grounding emotion in situated conceptualization Christine D. Wilson-Mendenhall a , Lisa Feldman Barrett b , ∗∗ ,W. Kyle Simmons c , Lawrence W. Barsalou a , ∗ a Emory University, United States b Northeastern University, United States c The Laureate Institute for Brain Research, United States a r t i c l e i n f o  Article history: Received 10 August 2010Received in revised form 3 December 2010Accepted 20 December 2010 Available online 28 December 2010 Keywords: EmotionConceptual systemGrounded cognitionEmbodied cognitionSituated action a b s t r a c t According to the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion, the situated conceptualization used to construe asituation determines the emotion experienced. A neuroimaging experiment tested two core hypothesesof this theory: (1) different situated conceptualizations produce different forms of the same emotion indifferentsituations,(2)thecompositionofasituatedconceptualizationemergesfromsharedmultimodalcircuitry distributed across the brain that produces emotional states generally. To test these hypotheses,the situation in which participants experienced an emotion was manipulated. On each trial, participantsimmersed themselves in a physical danger or social evaluation situation and then experienced  fear   or anger  .AccordingtoHypothesis1,thebrainactivationsforthesameemotionshoulddifferasafunctionof theprecedingsituation(afterremovingactivationsthatarosewhileconstructingthesituation).Accordingto Hypothesis 2, the critical activations should reflect conceptual processing relevant to the emotion inthecurrentsituation,drawnfromsharedmultimodalcircuitryunderlyingemotion.Theresultssupportedthesepredictionsanddemonstratedthecompositionalprocessthatproducessituatedconceptualizationsdynamically. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction Untilrecently,conceptualizationhasplayedarelativelyperiph-eral role in theories of emotion (but see Fehr & Russell, 1984;Russell, 1991; Russell & Fehr, 1994). In basic emotion approaches(e.g., Allport, 1924; Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1971; McDougall,1921/1908; Panksepp, 1998; Tomkins, 1962, 1963), the central hypotheses are that emotions reflect an inborn instinct, and thatthe mere presence of relevant external conditions triggers evolvedbrainmechanismsinastereotypedandobligatoryway(e.g.,asnaketriggers the fear circuit; Ohman, Carlsson, Lundqvist, & Ingvar,2007;Ohman&Mineka,2001).Inappraisalapproachestoemotion(e.g.,Arnold,1960a,1960b;Ellsworth&Scherer,2003;Frijda,1986;Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1991), the central hypotheses are thatemotions arise from a meaning analysis of the situation in termsof goals, needs, or concerns, and that these conceptualizations ∗ Correspondingauthorat:DepartmentofPsychology,EmoryUniversity,Atlanta,GA 30322, United States. Tel.: +1 404 727 4338. ∗∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, 125 Nightingale Hall,Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, United States. Tel.: +1 404 727 4338. E-mail addresses:  l.barrett@neu.edu (L.F. Barrett),barsalou@emory.edu (L.W. Barsalou). URLs:  http://www.affective-science.org/ (L.F. Barrett),http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/index.html(L.W.Barsalou). of external situational conditions elicit basic emotions indepen-dent of any further conceptual processing. In both basic emotionapproaches, emotions exist independently of human concepts forthem. The cognitive system might conceptually represent what anemotionisandwhatislikelytooccurwhenoneiselicited,buttheseconceptualizations do not play central roles in emotion itself.Recent theoretical developments, however, give conceptual-ization a central role in the construction of emotional episodes(Barrett, 2006a, 2009a). According to this approach, conceptual- izing a situation in a particular way causes it to be experiencedas an emotion (where by  situation  we mean not only an environ-mental setting and the physical entities and agents it contains,but also the dynamic actions that agents perform, and the events,interoceptive sensations, and mentalizing they experience). As thebrain represents successive situations one after another, concep-tualinterpretationofeachsituation–sometimestakingtheformof an emotion – creates a unified, meaningful representation of sub- jective experience, cognition, and the body in context, and thencontrols subsequent experience, cognition, and action.In this article, we begin by presenting a grounded theory of theconceptual system that underlies our account of how conceptual-ization produces emotion. The theory’s central assumptions are:(1) a concept is grounded in the systems for perception, action,and internal states that process its instances; (2) the situated con-ceptualization that represents a concept on a specific occasion 0028-3932/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.12.032  1106  C.D. Wilson-Mendenhall et al. / Neuropsychologia 49 (2011) 1105–1127  emerges from a network of concepts to represent the conceptcoherentlyinthecurrentsituation;(3)situatedconceptualizationsrepresent abstract concepts, including emotion concepts; (4) onceactive, situated conceptualizations produce subsequent actions,internalstates,andperceptualconstruals.Afterlayingthistheoret-icalgroundwork,wepresenttheConceptualActTheoryofEmotioninwhichsituatedconceptualizationsforemotionconceptsplaythecentral role in producing emotion. Finally, we present an experi-ment that tests two key hypotheses of Conceptual Act Theory: (1)different situated conceptualizations represent an emotion con-cept (e.g., fear) in different situations; and (2) the compositionof situated conceptualizations reflects diverse contributions fromdistributedneuralcircuitrythatproducesemotionalstatesdynam-ically. 1.1. A grounded theory of the human conceptual system In this section, we summarize a theory of concepts developedelsewhere(e.g.,Barsalou,1999,2003a,2003b,2005a,2005b,2008a,2008b,2008c;Simmons&Barsalou,2003).Specifically,thistheoryassumesthatconceptsaregroundedinsituations,thebody,andthebrain’s modal systems for perception, action, and internal states 1 (e.g., Anderson, 2010; Martin, 2001, 2007; Damasio, 1989; Meyer& Damasio, 2009). We focus on non-emotion concepts initially toillustratepropertiesofthehumanconceptualsystem.Inthesubse-quent section, we extend these properties to emotion concepts intheConceptualActTheoryofEmotion.Muchdetailwillbeomittedfrom these accounts that can be found in the articles referenced(and especially in Barrett, 2006a; Barrett, Barsalou, Lindquist, &Wilson-Mendenhall, in preparation). 1.1.1. Concepts A concept aggregates information about category instancesinto some sort of integrated representation (e.g., Barsalou, 2003a,2005a; Barsalou & Hale, 1993; Murphy, 2002). The concept of  car  , for example, aggregates diverse information about cars intoa loosely organized representation that includes properties (e.g.,engine), relations (e.g., drivers operate cars), prototypes (e.g., thetypical car is a sedan), rules (e.g., for something to be a car, it mustuse an engine that drives four wheels to transport a small numberof people along a road), and exemplars (e.g., instances of sedans,coupes, station wagons, etc.). 2 Concepts develop for aspects of experience that are relevantrepeatedlyacrosssituations.Becausecarsareafrequentlyrelevantaspect of experience, a concept develops in memory to repre-sent them. Concepts similarly develop for other diverse aspectsof human experience, including objects, agents, and settings inphysicalsituations(e.g., keys , mechanics ,  garage ).Additionally,con-cepts develop to represent the behavior of objects, agents, andsettings (e.g.,  skidding  ,  driving  ,  bustling  ). From simpler concepts,more complex concepts emerge for events (e.g.,  trip ). Conceptssimilarlydevelopforawidevarietyofinternalstatesincludinginte-roceptions and mentalizing (e.g.,  thirst  ,  fatigue ,  doubt  ), as well asforthepropertiesandrelationsthatdescribeinstancesofconcepts(e.g.,  blue, slow, intense, above, after, cause, intend ). Although con-ceptsreflectexperiencetoaconsiderableextent,theyundoubtedlyhavebiologicalbasesthatscaffoldlearning(Barsalou,1999,2008a;Carey, 2009; Rips, 2010; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). 1 Throughout this article, “internal states” will include interoceptions (e.g., affec-tivevalence,arousal,hunger,pain,visceralactivity,muscletension)andmentalizing(e.g., self-related thoughts, evaluations, representing the thoughts of others, repre-senting how one is perceived by others). 2 Throughoutthisarticle,weuseitalicstoindicateaconcept(e.g., car  )andquotesto indicate the word or phrase associated with it (e.g., “car”). Theoryandresearchstronglysuggestthatconceptsdonothaveconceptualcores,namely,conceptualcontentthatisnecessaryandsufficient for membership in the associated category. In a famousphilosophical argument, Wittgenstein’s (1953) concluded that a conceptual core cannot be found for the category of   games  (e.g., noproperty is true of all category members). Since then, researchershave similarly argued that natural categories do not typically haveconceptual cores. Instead, loosely distributed similarity relationsbetween category members – taking the form of a family resem-blanceorradialcategory–appeartostructuremostcategories(e.g.,Lakoff, 1987; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). 3 Nevertheless, people oftenbelieve mistakenly that categories do have cores, even when clearexceptions exist (e.g., Brooks & Hannah, 2006), perhaps because a word for the category that always takes the same form impliesthat a stable conceptual core analogously represents its meaning(e.g., Barsalou, 1989; James, 1950/1890). Theories of psychological essentialism similarly note people’s (often unjustified) propensityfor creating conceptual cores (e.g., Gelman, 2003).Exemplar theories of categorization further illustrate that loosecollectionsofmemoriesforcategorymemberscanproducesophis-ticated classification behavior, demonstrating that abstractions forprototypes and rules are not necessary (e.g., Medin & Schaffer,1978; Nosofsky, 1984). Neural net systems similarly demonstratethat only loose statistical coherence is necessary for sophisticatedcategorization (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985). To the extent that abstraction does occur for a category, it may only occur par-tially across small sets of category instances (e.g., Medin & Ross,1989; Spalding & Ross, 1994); it may primarily reflect the abstrac-tion of non-defining properties and relations that can be used todescribe category members in a dynamcial manner (e.g., Barsalou,2003a, 2005a); it may reflect online abstraction at retrieval, ratherthan stored abstractions in memory (e.g., Hintzman, 1986).The absence of conceptual cores will play a central role inour account of emotion concepts. From hereon, our treatment of concepts assumes that they do not have cores but are instead rep-resented by loose collections of situated exemplars, accompaniedby the various forms of limited abstraction just noted.Onceconceptsbecomeestablishedinmemory,theyplaycentralroles throughout cognition, supporting perception, categoriza-tion, inference, and many other processes (e.g., Barsalou, 2003b;Murphy, 2002). As people experience a situation, they categorizetheagents,objects,setting,behaviors,events,properties,relations,bodily states, mental states, and so forth that are present. As someaspect of experience is perceived, it projects onto all concepts inparallel,withconceptscompetingtocategorizetheaspect,withthebest-fitting concept winning (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981).Once an entity has been categorized, categorical inferences follow,including inferences about how the entity is likely to behave, howonecanbestinteractwiththeentity,thelikelyvaluetobeobtainedfrominteractingwiththeentity,andsoforth.Suchinferencesresultfrom accessing category knowledge associated with the conceptused to categorize the current instance, and then generalizing thisknowledge to the instance. 1.1.2. Multiple modalities underlie concepts Concepts originate and operate in the context of continu-ous situated activity (Barsalou, 2003b, 2005b, 2008c; Barsalou,Breazeal,&Smith,2007;Yeh&Barsalou,2006).Assituatedactivity 3 In a family resemblance, a given exemplar is similar to some exemplars of acategory but not to all, with each exemplar being similar to a different subset, suchthatexemplarsbeararesemblancetooneanother,withnopropertiessharedacrossall category exemplars. In a radial category, multiple chains of related exemplarsdevelopthatareoneormoretransformationsawayfromaninitialcategorymember,with no properties common across chains.  C.D. Wilson-Mendenhall et al. / Neuropsychologia 49 (2011) 1105–1127  1107 unfolds,numerousmodalitiesandsystemsthatprocessperception,action, and internal states respond continually (e.g., vision, audi-tion, motor planning and execution, interoception, mentalizing,attention, reward, affect, executive processing, language, memory,reasoning).Dependingontheconcept,aparticularprofileofmodal-ities and systems is more or less relevant (e.g., Cree and McRae,2003). For example, the modality of audition is often relevant for musicalinstruments butnotfor  fruit, whereasthemodalitiesoftasteandsmellareoftenrelevantfor  fruit  butnotfor musicalinstruments (which is not to say that audition is unimportant for representinga crunchy apple or that smell is irrelevant for representing an oldwooden guitar). In general, the informational content of a conceptcan be viewed as a collection of the multimodal information thathas been experienced and processed for its instances. Dependingon the particular modalities relevant, the resulting profile of activ-ity becomes stored in distributed neural circuitry that processesthe concept, thereby creating a multimodal representation of therelevant processing that typically occurs.Extensive evidence now exists that different kinds of con-cepts emerge from different multimodal systems in the brain (cf.McClelland, 2010). Depending on the modalities relevant for pro-cessing a concept’s instances, particular modal areas of the brainstore information about the category and can later represent thecategory in the absence of actual instances. Martin (2001, 2007),for example, has shown that different multimodal profiles rep-resent living vs. non-living things. Other research has similarlyestablishedthemultimodalprofilesthatrepresenttheselfandoth-ers (e.g., Northoff et al., 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009; cf. Legrand & Ruby, 2009), people, buildings, and tools (e.g., Simmons, Reddish, Bellgowan, & Martin, 2010), the external world vs. internal states(e.g., Golland, Golland, Bentin, & Malach, 2008), and so forth. 1.1.3. Situated conceptualizations Conceptsarerarelyrepresentedinavacuum.Whentheconceptfor  car   becomes active, it is not represented in isolation, floating inspace, but is instead represented in a meaningful background sit-uation (e.g., Barsalou, 2003b, 2005b, 2008c; Barsalou, Niedenthal,Barbey,&Ruppert,2003).A car  ,forexample,mightberepresentedin a garage, parking lot, or gas station, or on a dirt road or high-way. Many empirical studies demonstrate the extensive presenceof situational information as people represent and use concepts(e.g., Bar, 2004; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Chaigneau,Barsalou, & Zamani, 2009; Wu & Barsalou, 2009; for a review, seeYeh & Barsalou, 2006).We refer to the representation of a concept in a backgroundsituationasa situatedconceptualization .Typically,situatedconcep-tualizations include a setting, agents, objects, behaviors, events,and internal states, each represented by relevant concepts. Thus,the representation of a car on a particular occasion exists withina network of background concepts that represent elements of theentire situation. Furthermore, tremendous diversity exists in theparticular background concepts that situate a concept on differ-entoccasions.Ratherthantheconceptbeingrepresentedinarigidmanner across situations, it is represented in widely varying setsof background concepts that contextualize it in each situation.From the perspective of grounded cognition, situated concep-tualizations are also responsible for producing the action, internalstates, and perceptual construals that underlie goal-related activ-ity in the current situation. Because modalities for action, internalstates, and perceptual construals are typically active when a con-cept is learned, situated conceptualizations generate activity inthesesystemsastheybecomeactiveonlateroccasions.Onactivat-ing the concept for  apple,  an associated situated conceptualizationmight activate representations of actions for eating the apple, rep-resentations of internal states such as satiation and pleasure, andperceptual construals that distort taste towards the typical tasteof an apple (e.g., Goldstone, 1995; Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, &Gegenfurtner,2006).Notonlydoes apple representinstancesoftheconcept,italsocontrolsinteractionswithinstancesandpredictstheresultant events.In Barrett et al. (in preparation), we further proposed a distinc- tion between concepts that have situated conceptualizations asbackgrounds vs. concepts that  are  situated conceptualizations. Ingeneral, concrete concepts such as  chair   refer to part of a situationand are contextualized when surrounding background conceptsrepresent the remainder of a situation in a situated conceptual-ization (e.g., concepts for living room, sitting, feeling comfortable).Conversely, abstract concepts such as  convince  typically refer toan entire situation, not just to part of one, such that an entire sit-uated conceptualization represents them. C onvince , for example,integratesanagent,otherpeople,anidea,communicativeacts,andpossible changes in belief, all organized with a variety of relations,such as the relation of one person having an idea, talking withanother, conveying the idea to the other, attempting to changea belief, and so forth (Wilson-Mendenhall, Simmons, Martin, &Barsalou, in preparation). In other words, abstract concepts like convince arerelationalstructuresthatintegratemanydifferentcon-cepts in a situated conceptualization.Finally, we assume that many situated conceptualizations areassociatedwithagivenconcept,reflectingthevarietyofsituationsin which it is experienced (Barsalou, 2003b, 2008c). For c onvince ,differentsituatedconceptualizationsrepresentconvincingafriend,parent, policeman, mugger, audience, and so forth. In each situa-tion,therespectiveconceptualizationsupportssituatedinteractionin the relevant situation. Rather than the category having a con-ceptual core, a set of situated exemplars represents it that exhibitfamily resemblance and radial structure, accompanied by limitedabstractions. 1.2. The Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion IntheConceptualActTheoryofEmotion,weproposethatemo-tion concepts are abstract concepts that work in fundamentallythe same as way as other kinds of abstract concepts. Like otherabstract concepts, emotion concepts aggregate diverse informa-tion within an instance, referring to an entire situation, not just topartofone.Likeotherconcepts,emotionconceptssupportcatego-rizationandinference,andalsocontrolsubsequentaction,internalstates,andperceptualconstruals.Likeotherconcepts,emotioncon-cepts do not have conceptual cores but are represented by loosecollections of situated conceptualizations. In this section, we firstaddress the role of situated conceptualizations in representingemotion, and then address multimodal contributions to emotionconcepts. Finally we address the roles of emotion concepts in pro-ducingtheconceptualactsthatgenerateemotion.Furtherdetailonthis account can be found in Barrett (2006a) and Barrett et al. (in preparation). 1.2.1. Situated conceptualizations represent emotion concepts A key assumption of our theoretical approach is that emotionconcepts,likeotherabstractconcepts(e.g., convince ),refertoentiresituations, and thereby represent settings, agents, objects, actions,events,interoceptions,andmentalizing.Inotherwords,anemotionconceptisarelationalstructurethatintegratesmultiplepartsofanexperienced situation.We further assume that a specific emotion concept contains alarge set of situated conceptualizations that produce emotion inmany different kinds of situations, with each situated conceptu-alization producing a different form of the emotion. Consider onepossible situated conceptualization associated with  fear  , where arunnerbecomeslostonawoodedtrailatdusk.Inthissituatedcon-ceptualization, concepts for  forest  ,  night  ,  animals ,  thirst  ,  confusion ,  1108  C.D. Wilson-Mendenhall et al. / Neuropsychologia 49 (2011) 1105–1127  andmanyothersbecomeintegratedmeaningfullytorepresent  fear  ,including the associated internal experience and potential actions.Consider another possible situated conceptualization associatedwith  fear  , where someone is unprepared to give an important pre-sentationatwork.Inthissituatedconceptualization,adifferentsetof concepts represents the situation, including  presentation ,  speak-ing  ,  audience ,  supervisor  , and many others. Again, the integratedrepresentation of diverse concepts into a situated conceptualiza-tion constitutes an instance of   fear  , including associated internalexperience and action.Fromthisperspective,  fear  cannotbeunderstoodindependentlyof an agent conceptualizing his- or herself in a particular situation.Thisisnotanewinsightaboutemotionbutonethatemergedinthefirsthalfofthe20thcentury,appearing,forexample,inthewritingsof  James(1994/1894,p.206). F ear  canlookandfeelquitedifferentlyindifferentinstances.Whenyoufearaflyingcockroach,youmightgrab a magazine and swat it; when you fear disappointing a loveone, you might think of other ways to make them feel good aboutyou; when you fear a mysterious noise late at night, you mightfreeze and listen; when you fear giving a presentation, you mightruminateaboutaudiencereactionsorover-prepare;whenyoufeargettingaflushot,youmightcringeanticipatingthepain;whenyoufearhurtingafriend’sfeelings,youmighttellawhitelie.Sometimesyouwillapproachinfear,andsometimesyouwillavoid.Sometimesyourheartratewillgoup,andsometimesitwillgodown.Whateverthe situation demands.Thepresenceofdiversesituatedconceptualizationsforanemo-tion explains the Emotion Paradox (Barrett, 2006a, 2006b; Barrettet al., 2007). If, as basic emotion theorists assume, an emotion like  fear   is associated with a module that always executes in the samemanner to produce the same stereotyped cascade of responses,thenwhydotheneuralandbodilystatesassociatedwith  fear  showtremendous variability across instances (for reviews of this vari-ability, see Barrett, 2006b; Barrett et al., 2007; for a discussion see Barrett,2009a)?Situatedconceptualizationsofferanaturalaccountof this variability: If different situated conceptualizations repre-sent the same emotion category, then differences among themacrossallthemodalitiesandsystemsthatprocesssettings,actions,and internal states are likely to produce considerable variabil-ity in facial actions, heart rate patterns, breathing patterns, andneural activations. Furthermore, because there is not one bodilysignature for each emotion, the same body state across differentsituations can be conceptualized as different emotions, dependingon the situated conceptualization active to interpret it (cf. Dunlap,1932).Finally, as described earlier for concepts in general, we assumethat the situated conceptualizations representing an emotion bearloose similarity relations to one another, as in a family resem-blance or radial category. To the extent that abstractions exist foran emotion, they are not core properties but instead representrelevant information within particular situations, or non-definingproperties used to describe the emotion across situations. Thelow consistency of emotion markers – facial actions, heart rate,breathing, skin conductance, action, and neural activity – acrossreviewsandmeta-analysessupportthelackofcoreconceptualcon-tent for emotions (e.g., Barrett, 2006b; Barrett et al., 2007; Koberet al., 2008; Lindquist et al., in press; Wager et al., 2008), imply-ing that loose collections of exemplars represent emotions instead(Barrett,2006a;Fehr&Russell,1984;Russell,1991;Russell&Fehr,1994). 1.2.2. Composed vs. stored situated conceptualizations So far we have focused on situated conceptualizations storedin memory that represent concepts, including emotion concepts.We further assume, however, that novel situated conceptualiza-tions are composed online, tailored to the current situation (e.g.,Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, Herrnberger, & Kiefer, 2008). Again, imag-ine being unprepared for a presentation at work and experiencingfear. If similar experiences have occurred previously, then a situ-ated conceptualization that represents them might be retrieved togenerate inferences about the current situation and guide behav-ior.If,however,thecurrentsituationisnotexactlylikeanyoftheseprevious situations, the situated conceptualization retrieved maybe adapted somewhat, incorporating important information fromthe situation, and retrieving further elaborative information frommemory to integrate all the active information coherently. As aresult, a novel situated conceptualization is composed online, dif-ferent from other situated conceptualizations stored in memoryfor  fear  . In turn, the composed conceptualization becomes storedwith  fear  , augmenting its stored collection of situated conceptual-izations.Asthisexampleillustrates,weassumethatsituatedconceptual-izationsexistintwoforms.Ontheonehand,memoriesofprevioussituatedconceptualizationsrepresentaconceptinmemory.Ontheotherhand,newconceptualizationsarecomposedonlinethatcom-bineastoredconceptualizationwithinformationaboutthecurrentsituation and other information in memory needed to integratethem. This relation between stored and composed conceptualiza-tionswillbecentralindrawingpredictionsfortheexperimentlaterand for explaining its results. 1.2.3. Multiple modalities and systems represent emotionconcepts Like all concepts, emotion concepts srcinate and operate inthe context of continuous situated activity, with situations typi-cally including a physical setting, agents, objects, and actions inthe world, interoceptive sensations from the body, and mental-izing related to prospective and retrospective thought. Over thecourse of situated activity, numerous modalities and systems inthe brain and body respond continually to represent the situa-tion, including exteroceptive perception, interoception, core affect(valuationandsalienceprocessesthatunderlieexperiencesofplea-sure/displeasure and arousal), attention, categorization, executiveprocessing, episodic memory, action, language, reasoning, and soforth.Meta-analysesofemotionresearchsupportthehypothesisthatmultiple modalities and systems are engaged during the expe-rience and perception of emotion (Kober et al., 2008; Lindquistet al., in press; Wager et al., 2008). Furthermore, diverse studieson animals, patients with brain damage, electrical brain stim-ulation, and brain imaging clearly show that different emotioncategories do not correspond consistently and specifically to dis-tinctbrainmodules(forreviews,seeBarrett,2006b,2009a;Barrettet al., 2007). For example, subcortical circuits involving the peri-aqueductal gray (PAG) underlie individual behavioral adaptationsfor freezing, defensive aggression, and withdrawal, respectively(Bandler, Keay, Floyd, & Price, 2000; Bandler & Shipley, 1994), and an increase in PAG activity is evident in a meta-analytic summaryof neuroimaging studies on emotion (Kober et al., 2008). Notably, however, these circuits do not correspond to particular emotioncategories in a one-to-one fashion (Barrett, 2009a; Barrett et al.,2007). Even rats display various combinations of freezing, defen-siveaggression,andwithdrawalwhenfacedwithathreatassumedto produce a fear state, varying with the situational context(Bouton, 2005; Fanselow, 1994; Iwata & LeDoux, 1988; Reynolds& Berridge, 2002; Vazdarjanova & McGaugh, 1998; cf. Barrett, 2009a).Rather than there being a unique module in sub-cortical brainareas for an emotion like fear, emotions appear to result fromdistributed circuitry throughout the brain that implements per-ception, action, interoception, core affect, attention, executiveprocessing,memory,language,reasoning,andsoforth.Indeedpre-
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